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Abstract
This paper elucidates the impact of city growth on wage and wage
inequality using a search-theoretical approach. Firms differ in capital
intensity and land intensity of the jobs created. When a worker meets
a job via a matching technology, a match-specific productivity level is
realized and they sign a job contract when they agree with the bargain-
ing wage. A rise in population density leads to rental increment. As a
consequence, a higher expected flow profit is required for the creation
of a good job. Rent-sharing ensures an increase of the average wage
in the good-job sector. This, in turn, increases the reservation wage
of workers in the equilibrium. Although the rental increment does not
affect the setup costs in the bad-job sector, higher realized produc-
tivity level is required to cover higher reservation wage. Since only
job contacts with realized productivity levels exceeding reservation
productivity threshold are observed, such increase in the threshold
raises also the average wage in the bad-job sector. Hence, the average
productivity, the match quality and wage go up in each sector unam-
biguously, giving rise to urban wage premium. In addition, this paper
predicts that urbanization widens residual wage inequality of a city.
Existing empirical evidence is presented to support the implications
of this model.
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1 Introduction
This paper purposes to develop a simple stochastic search model to analyze
the impact of city growth on labor market activity. In particular, the model
explains that in a denser city, 1) the urban wage premium improves, 2) the
average match quality improves and 3) the wage inequality is widened.
The model features three key elements. First, it introduces a search fric-
tion in the model economy. Therefore, the best match is not a guarantee.1
Moreover, as documented in the existing empirical works (Andersson et al.,
2007; Gautier and Teulings, 2009), job search and match quality matter in
explaining the urban wage premium. The introduction of job search and
search friction can help understand how urbanization improves wages. Sec-
ond, the model is incorporated with firm heterogeneity in which a good job
requires more equipment to create and is more productive than a bad job,
similar to Acemoglu (2001). The proportion of each job type is endogenously
determined so that the mechanism of how the composition of jobs changes in
response to city growth can be analyzed.2 Third, stochastic job matchings
allow a well-defined wage distribution within each sector so that the model
is able to elucidate the impact of city growth on wage inequality.
In our model, minimum unit of equipment is required for the establish-
ment of a job and the equipment occupies negligible space. To install extra
unit of equipment, land is needed. A good job is more capital intensive and
hence occupies land while a bad job only requires a minimum amount of
equipment. Firms are free to create either one of the two job types. When
a worker meets a job via a matching technology, a match-specific produc-
tivity level is realized and they enter into a contract when they agree with
the bargaining wage. A rise in population density leads to rental increment,
and consequently, higher expected flow profit is required to create a good
job. Rent-sharing ensures wages, on average, improve in the good-job sector.
1To capture the improvement in match quality and urban wage premium in a denser
city, Kim (1990, 1991) develops a model without search friction so that workers are always
in the best match. Not surprisingly, when more potential match partners exist in the
city, the match quality is enhanced. This leads to higher wage via wage bargaining pro-
cess between firms and workers. However, the best match assumption is far from reality
especially in the presence of search friction.
2In Sato (2001), technologies of jobs are horizontally differentiated and thus changes in
the composition of jobs do not imply any improvement in productivity. In our model, jobs
differ in productivity; therefore, urban wage premium could arise from job composition
adjustment. However, such channel is blocked in Sato (2001).
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This, in turn, increases the reservation wage of workers in the equilibrium.
Although rental increment does not affect the setup cost in the bad-job sector,
higher reservation productivity threshold is required to cover higher reserva-
tion wage of workers. Since only job contacts with realized productivity
levels exceeding the reservation productivity threshold are observed in the
equilibrium, such an increase in the threshold causes the average wage to rise
in the bad-job sector. Hence, average productivity, match quality and wage
go up in each sector unambiguously.
In the existing literature, several explanations about the urban wage
premium are offered. Rauch (1993) shows that cities facilitate knowledge
spillovers, enhancing human capital productivity and thus increasing wages
in the human capital industry. Another theory suggests that high-skilled
workers are attracted by city amenities or selectively migrate to cities with
more competent workers, generating the urban wage premium in cities (Bor-
jas et al., 1992; Yankow, 2006; Gould, 2007; Combes et al., 2008; Venables,
2011). However, Glaeser and Mare (2001) estimate the U.S. urban wage pre-
mium is about 25% even conditioning the measure of workers’ human capital,
reflecting such premium arises from the improvement of workers’ productiv-
ity. This paper purposes to explain how this 25% match quality improvement
arises from city growth conditioning labor compositions. In Andersson et al.
(2007), empirical evidence supports that the improvement in match quality
and thus productivity is an important source of urban wage premium. This
evidence supports the implications of our model, in which urbanization, by
means of rental increment, improves average productivity, match quality and
thus wage in each sector.
Glaeser (1999) predicts that urban wage premium exists and wage in-
equality declines with density. He argues that workers can augment their
human capital by interacting with those who are more talented; therefore,
more vigorous productive interaction exists in the low-skilled group. He fur-
ther pinpoints that such interaction rate increases with population density.
As a result, average wage rises with population density, giving rise to the ur-
ban wage premium. Moreover, the model predicts that the low-skilled gain
more than the high-skilled in a denser city because of higher expected gains
from productive interaction, narrowing the wage inequality. This prediction,
however, might not be consistent with existing empirical evidence. For ex-
ample, Bacolod et al. (2009) support that productivity gain associated with
agglomeration is larger for workers using stronger cognitive and people skills.
Hence, urbanization would reward higher wage premium to workers in sec-
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tors using cognitive skills, thereby increasing the residual wage inequality. In
addition to Bacolod et al. (2009), recent empirical works (Ciccone and Hall,
1996; Korpi, 2008; Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2010) support the positive link
between wage inequality and urbanization. Hence, a sound theoretical model
that analyzes the mechanism of how urban wage premium and the widened
wage inequality arise from urbanization is urged.
Sato (2001) introduces a job search component into his model to analyze
how urban wage premium arises. In his model, higher urban density implies
thicker labor market, which improves the outside option value of job-seekers
when search technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. To compensate
higher outside option value, higher reservation production value is required
for firms and workers to match, thereby improving the match quality and thus
generating an urban wage premium. Nevertheless, the urban wage premium
exists in his model only if the search technology exhibits increasing returns
to scale. Besides, the existing empirical works might have not yet reached a
consensus. For example, empirical studies find it constant returns to scale in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006). If it is the case, the urban wage premium
does not exist in Sato’s (2001) model. In contrast, our model is capable
of explaining wage premium as well as greater wage inequality in a denser
city by means of rental increment.3 It makes economics sense that a rise in
population density heightens the demand for housing and thus the bid rent.
Also, Winters (2009) gives evidence that higher wages are paid in area with
higher rent conditioning amenities. This evidence and the implications of
our model are in accord.
Our work complements the existing models (Glaeser, 1999; Sato, 2001;
Venables, 2011) in that our model predicts that urban wage premium stems
from rental increment and job match. Existing empirical studies also support
the implications of our model. For example, Gautier and Teulings (2009)
demonstrate that two-thirds of the urban wage premium can be explained by
job search. Meanwhile, as implied by Andersson et al. (2007), the urban wage
premium arises mainly from the improvement in match quality. In addition to
the urban wage premium, as documented in the existing literature (Ciccone
and Hall, 1996; Korpi, 2008; Bacolod et al., 2009; Baum-Snow and Pavan,
2010), wage inequality grows during urbanization. This paper contributes
3New York, London, Beijing, Tokyo and Hong Kong are examples of urbanization.
Their rentals are the highest in the world. In addition, Saiz (2007) provides empirical
evidence that a 1% increase in the population results in a 1% increase in the average rent
and housing price in the U.S.
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to the literature by elucidating the impact of city growth on residual wage
inequality. This section serves as an introduction, followed by the model
setup in section 2. Section 3 analyzes urban wage premium and residual
wage inequality in steady state equilibrium. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Model Setup
In the model economy of population L > 0, time is continuous. All work-
ers are infinitely-lived and risk neutral. The discount rate of workers is r.
Firms are also risk neutral with discount r. All firms incur minimum cost
of equipment k, which occupies negligible space.4 For an additional unit of
equipment, it requires firms to have an extra unit of land. Two types of
vacancies exist in the economy. One type of vacancies (bad job) requires
minimum cost of equipment k and negligible space (i.e. kb = k). Capital-
intensive job (good job) requires a firm to purchase extra equipment that
costs (σ − 1)k, where σ > 1 (i.e. kg = σk). Therefore, the capital-intensive
job occupies σ − 1 unit of land. Firms are free to create either one of the
two types of vacancies, and purchase the sector-specific capital and land (if
needed) before they create the corresponding jobs. Each worker can work for
one vacancy and each vacancy can place only one worker.
Land T is fixed in the economy. In the housing market, the unit price of
land is the discounted present value of rents, which is
∫∞
0 <ertdt. Construc-
tion cost C of a unit of land depends on the population density. The higher
the population density, the higher will be the construction cost. Hence, C
is increasing in the density L/T . Since the amount of land is fixed, C(L) is
strictly increasing in the population density (i.e. C ′(L) > 0,∀L > 0). The
housing market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Hence, it is straight-
forward to show that the rent ensures marginal revenue equals marginal cost
as follows:
</r = C(L) (1)
Let u and vj be the unemployment and the number of unfilled jobs j respec-
tively. Hence, v = vb + vg is the total amount of vacancies in the economy.
A matching technology M(u, v) is assumed to be differentiable, increasing
4This assumption is not restrictive. Salesmen, porters, dustmen, security guards are
examples of jobs that require negligible space to create a position.
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in its arguments, concave, and constant returns to scale. The contact rate
for a vacancy can be written as M(u, v)/v. Define q(θ) ≡ M(u, v)/v where
θ ≡ v/u is the labor market tightness. It is straightforward to show that a
labor contact rate is M(u, v)/u = θq(θ). Also, one can show that q(·) is a
differentiable decreasing function. Furthermore, we assume limθ→0 q(θ) =∞,
limθ→0 θq(θ) = 0, limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0 and limθ→∞ θq(θ) =∞.
After a worker and a vacancy j meet via a matching technology function,
both parties realize the productivity level yj of the match. They sign a
contract if they agree with the bargaining wage. Otherwise the job-seeker
remains unemployed and the vacancy remains unfilled in the next instant.5
Once the contract is signed, this match generates a production value of yj
each instant.
The realized productivity level of a worker follows Pareto distribution
yj ∼ Pareto(a, yj), in which a > 1 is a Pareto index, and the productivity
distribution has a full support over [y
j
,∞).6 To simplify the analysis, it is
assumed that y
j
= Akj and A < r to capture the possibility that the realized
production value can be lower than the rate of return rkj. The cumulative
distribution function is:
Fj(y) =
 1− (
y
j
y
)a, for y ≥ y
j
;
0, for y < y
j
.
The assumption of Pareto productivity distribution captures two properties.
First, the higher the productivity, the lower will be its likelihood, i.e. f ′(δ) <
0, where fj(y) is the corresponding density function. Second, no worker
generates infinite amount of goods, i.e. limy→∞ fj(y) = 0, ∀j ∈ {b, g}.
The equilibrium will be characterized through a series of Bellman equa-
tions. Let JEj (yj) be the discounted present value of a worker’s employment
in a job j, where j ∈ {b, g}. Also, let JU be the discounted present value
of a worker being unemployed. Let wj(yj) be the wage of the worker in the
vacancy. JEj (yj) is written as:
rJEj (yj) = wj(yj) + λ[J
U − JEj (yj)] (2)
5Empirical evidence strongly supports this job-contact effect. See Barron (1975) and
Pissarides (1986).
6Helpman et al. (2010) make the same assumption. Readers interested in the justifi-
cation of this assumption may refer to Helpman et al. (2010) for further details.
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A worker with productivity level yj receives wage wj(yj) and separates from
the job at an exogenous rate λ. Similarly, we can write JU as:
rJU = z + θq(θ){φ
∫ [
max{JEb (x), JU} − JU
]
dFb(x)
+(1− φ)
∫ [
max{JEg (x), JU} − JU
]
dFg(x)} (3)
where φ ≡ vb/v is the fraction of unfilled bad jobs amongst all vacancies.
A job-seeker receives unemployment benefit z7 and matches with a vacancy
at a rate θq(θ). Also, let JFj (yj) be the discounted present value of a filled
vacancy that is occupied by a worker and JVj be the discounted present value
of an unfilled job j. We can write JFj (yj) as
rJFj (yj) = yj − wj(yj) + λ[JVj − JFj (yj)] (4)
A vacancy generates revenue yj, pays wage wj(yj), and separates from a
worker when an exogenous separation shock comes. Similarly, JVj can be
written as:
rJVj = q(θ)
∫ [
max{JFj (x), JVj } − JVj
]
dFj(x) (5)
Firms are free to create jobs to exhaust all rents so that
JVb = k, J
V
g = σk +
∫ ∞
0
(σ − 1)<ertdt (6)
Following the literature (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002; Sato, 2004; Zenou, 2009;
Gautier and Zenou, 2010), wages are determined by maximizing the Nash
product [JEj (yj)−JU ]β[JFj (yj)−JVj ]1−β to split the matching surplus, where
β ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power of workers. It can be found that wage
wj(yj) is the solution of the following equation:
JEj (yj)− JU = β[JEj (yj)− JU + JFj (yj)− JVj ] (7)
Intuitively, the matching surplus of a worker is a fraction of the total match-
ing surplus. Using equations (2), (4), (6) and (7), the wage equations are as
follows:
wj(yj) = rJ
U + β(yj − rJU − rJVj ) (8)
7The unemployment benefit could be financed by a lump sum tax, which will not affect
the result and the analysis.
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Intuitively, a worker is compensated with the outside option value and a
fraction β of the net flow profit. It can be easily verified that wage wj(yj) is
strictly increasing in yj. Using equations (2) and (4) as well as w
′
j(yj) > 0,
∂JEj (yj)/∂yj > 0 and ∂J
F
j (yj)/∂yj > 0, there exists a unique productivity
level such that JEj (yj) = J
U and JFj (yj) = J
V
j respectively. Together with
equation (7), it is straightforward to show that the reservation productivity
thresholds of workers and jobs are identical. Denote the reservation produc-
tivity level of job j by yRj . Then, by definition, J
E
j (y
R
j ) ≡ JU . Since JEj (·)
is an increasing function, a worker and a job j will accept all the matches so
long as the realized productivity level exceeds yRj . Using J
E
j (y
R
j ) ≡ JU and
equation (8), the reservation productivity level is:
yRj = rJ
U + rJVj (9)
It is intuitive to notice that the reservation productivity value just covers
the outside option value of a worker and a job. The reservation productivity
level is higher in the good-job sector, yRg − yRb = (σ − 1)(< + rk) > 0, to
cover higher capital and rental cost. A job-seeker and an unfilled vacancy j
are willing to sign a contract if the realized productivity level is higher than
yRj . Otherwise the job-seeker remains unemployed and the vacancy remains
unfilled. Regarding the unemployment rate, the flow of workers back to
unemployment equals the flow of job-seekers out of unemployment in the
steady state. Hence, the steady state unemployment is as follows:
u
L
=
λ
λ+ θq(θ)[φ(1− Fb(yRb )) + (1− φ)(1− Fg(yRg ))]
(10)
Unemployment rate is strictly decreasing in θ and increasing in yRj . Intu-
itively, as the market tightness θ increases, workers find jobs faster. This low-
ers the unemployment rate. Also, an increase in the productivity thresholds
yRj reduces the probability that jobs and workers are successfully matched,
thereby increasing the unemployment rate.
3 Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is defined as value functions JEj , J
F
j , J
U and JVj ,
rent <, wage wj, reservation productivity level yRj , a fraction of unfilled bad
job φ, unemployment rate u and labor market tightness θ such that equations
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(1)-(7), (9)-(10) are satisfied for all j ∈ {b, g}. Using equations (4), (5), (8)
and (9), two zero-profit equations can be written as:
rJVj = q(θ)
1− β
r + λ
[1− F (yRj )][E(yj − yRj |yj ≥ yRj )] (11)
Vacancies are created until cost equals the expected flow profit. Differ-
entiating [1 − F (yRj )]E(yj − yRj |yj ≥ yRj ) =
∫∞
yRj
(x − yRj )f(x)dx with re-
spect to yRj using Leibniz integral rule, it is straightforward to show that
[1−F (yRj )]E(yj − yRj |yj ≥ yRj ) is decreasing in yRj . Using equation (11), it is
intuitive to notice that yRj and θ are negatively related because higher reser-
vation threshold reduces the match rate and thus the expected flow profit.
As a result, fewer vacancies are created and thus lower θ is resulted in the
equilibrium. Regarding the existence of both types of jobs, the following
holds in the equilibrium:
rJVg
rJVb
=
[1− F (yRg )][E(yg − yRg |yg ≥ yRg )]
[1− F (yRb )][E(yb − yRb |yb ≥ yRb )]
(12)
It can be easily shown that (σa−1− 1)σ/(σ− 1) > </rk is a necessary condi-
tion to hold equation (12). Otherwise there exists only one type of jobs in the
steady state equilibrium. I assume (σa−1 − 1)σ/(σ − 1) > </rk throughout
the model to ensure φ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Using Pareto distribution, equations (6),
(9) and (11), the steady state reservation productivity level yR∗b and y
R∗
g are
given by:
yR∗b =
(σ − 1)(rk + <)
(
y
g
y
b
)
a
a−1 ( 1(σ−1)<
rk
+σ
)
1
a−1 − 1
, yR∗g = y
R∗
b + (σ − 1)(rk + <) (13)
The steady state reservation productivity level yRj exists and is given by equa-
tion (13). Using equations (11) and (13), the equilibrium market tightness
is given by:
rk = q(θ)
1− β
r + λ
[1− F (yR∗b )][E(yb − yR∗b |yb ≥ yR∗b )] (14)
where yR∗b solves equation (13). Since the right hand side of equation (14)
is strictly decreasing with θ, θ∗ ∈ (0,∞) is unique in the equilibrium. Using
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equations (3), (5), (6) and (9), φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) can be obtained from the following
equation:
yR∗b = z + rk + q(θ
∗)
β
1− β {φrk + (1− φ)[(σ − 1)<+ σrk]} (15)
where yR∗b and θ
∗ are from equations (13) and (14). Since the right hand side
of equation (15) is strictly decreasing with φ, φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) is unique.
Proposition 1. Given any productivity level y ≥ yRg , a worker receives a
higher wage in the bad-job sector. On average, wage is higher in the good-job
sector.
Proof. See the appendix.
The first implication of proposition (1) is concerned about the wage dif-
ferential across sectors with identical production value. Having identical
productivity level but a higher investment and rental cost, a good job will
generate lower net flow profit than a bad job. Hence, a worker receives a
lower wage in a good job due to rent-sharing. The second part of proposition
(1) states that wage is, on average, higher in the good-job sector. Intuitively,
a good job incurs a more expensive equipment cost and rental than a bad job
so that it has to generate a higher expected flow profit for its creation. In
equilibrium, the rent-sharing rule ensures, on average, a higher wage in the
good-job sector. Since workers are homogenous, the mean wage differentials
across two sectors can be interpreted as residual wage inequality. In other
words, with identical observable characteristics of workers, wage is, on aver-
age, higher in the good-job sector, generating the residual wage inequality.
This is in line with the evidence that more capital-intensive jobs pay higher
wages (Abowd et al., 1999).
3.1 City Size and Labor Market
In this section, the effect of larger city size on labor market is examined. This
section shows that a rise in population density leads to rental increment. City
growth ameliorates match quality by means of higher rental and reservation
productivity thresholds, generating the urban wage premium. In addition,
this section analyzes the relationship between city size and wage inequality.
Existing empirical evidence is shown to support the implications of the model.
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Proposition 2. A denser city has a higher reservation threshold yR∗j in each
sector and a lower labor market tightness θ∗.
Proof. See the appendix.
In a denser city, the higher rental requires a good job to increase its
reservation productivity threshold to cover its setup cost. Regarding the
bad-job sector, rental increment does not have any impact on the setup cost
of a bad job. However, the equilibrium effect of city growth increases the
outside option value of a worker JU , which will be discussed later. Since
the reservation productivity level merely covers the outside option value of a
worker and an unfilled job, the increase in JU further increases both yRb and
yRg . In addition, higher rental discourages the creation of good jobs, thereby
reducing labor market tightness θ. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence of Detang-Dessendre and Gaigne (2009), in which they document
that although the number of jobs rises with city population, the probability
of a job-seeker receiving a job offer is higher in a small or medium city in
France due to higher labor market tightness.
Proposition 3. City growth has the following effects:
1. Average labor productivity E(yj|yj ≥ yRj ) improves in each sector.
2. Total matching surplus, on average, improves in each sector.
i.e. E(JEj (yj)− JU + JFj (yj)− JVj |yj ≥ yRj ) goes up for all j ∈ {b, g}.
3. Average wage increases in each sector, generating the urban wage pre-
mium.
i.e. E(wj(yj)|yj ≥ yRj ) increases for all j ∈ {b, g}.
4. Residual wage inequality rises.
i.e.
dE(wg(yg)|yg≥yRg )
dL
>
dE(wb(yb)|yb≥yRb )
dL
> 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Rental is higher in a denser city; hence, higher realized productivity level
and expected flow profit are needed to create a good job in the equilibrium.
Only job contacts with realized productivity level exceeding reservation pro-
ductivity threshold are observed; hence, average labor productivity improves
in the good-job sector. This causes the outside option value of workers to
increase. Although rental increment has no impact on the setup cost of a bad
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job, higher realized productivity level and expected flow profit are required
to compensate the increase in the outside option value of workers. Similarly,
such increase in the reservation productivity threshold improves average la-
bor productivity in the bad-job sector. On average, workers receive higher
bargaining wages in each sector due to rent-sharing.
This implication is in accord with the existing empirical evidence that
urban wage premium improves in a denser city (Glaeser and Mare, 2001;
Andersson et al., 2007; Gould, 2007; Gautier and Teulings, 2009). For exam-
ple, Glaeser and Mare (2001) estimate that the U.S. urban wage premium is
about 25% after conditioning experience, education and job characteristics.
Controlling the measure of workers’ human capital, this result clearly illus-
trates that the urban wage premium arises from the improvement in workers’
productivity in a larger city. Gautier and Teulings (2009) give support that
two-thirds of the urban wage premium can be explained by job search. An-
dersson et al. (2007) support that assortive matching is an important source
of urban wage premium in the U.S. Hence, the implications of our model
that larger city size facilitates job match by means of higher rental and thus
enhances average match quality, productivity and wage are in accord with
empirical evidence.
Since rental increment has a direct impact on the good-job sector in this
model, the city growth effect on urban wage premium is larger in this sector.
Therefore, residual wage inequality becomes wider in a denser city. Moreover,
it is relatively less profitable to create a bad job in response to city growth
because the expected flow profit grows faster in the good-job sector. As a
consequence, the fraction of unfilled bad jobs declines. These implications
and the existing empirical studies are in line with one another (Ciccone and
Hall, 1996; Korpi, 2008, Bacolod et al., 2009, Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2010).
For example, Ciccone and Hall (1996) give support that wage inequality is
larger in a denser city while Baum-Snow and Pavan (2010) find that wage
inequality and city population have a strong monotonic relationship in the
U.S. In particular, their result shows that about a quarter to one-third of the
overall wage inequality can be explained by city population. Their finding
is consistent with the implications of this model in that wage inequality
rises with city size. In addition, Bacolod et al. (2009) give support that the
productivity gains associated with agglomeration are larger for workers using
stronger cognitive skills, rewarding workers higher wage premium. Hence,
urbanization widens residual wage inequality. In this model, a good job, on
average, experiences more productivity gain from city growth than a bad job.
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In addition, residual wage inequality, defined as average wage differentials of
workers across two sectors, is larger in a denser city. These implications
cohere with the existing empirical evidence.
4 Conclusion
This paper has considered the role of rent in cities. Using a search-theoretical
approach, our discussion shows that urban wage premium exists in the ab-
sence of knowledge spillovers. Our model analyzes the mechanism as to how
urbanization induces wage and wage inequality to grow via job match and
rental increment. Although the model is simple, it gives rich economic in-
tuition on urban wage premium. In particular, it shows that city growth
improves match quality and labor productivity, thereby giving rise to the
urban wage premium. Since city growth impacts disparate sectors to various
extents, growth of average wage varies across sectors. This generates residual
wage inequality growth in a denser city. Implications of this model cohere
with recent empirical studies on urban wage premium (Glaeser and Mare,
2001; Andersson et al., 2007; Gould, 2007; Gautier and Teulings, 2009) as
well as wage inequality (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Korpi, 2008, Bacolod et al.,
2009, Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2010). Works on the decomposition of wage
inequality can be conducted in the future.
5 Proof
5.1 Proof of Proposition (1)
Proof. Using the wage equation (8), we have
wg(y)− wb(y) = −β(σ − 1)(rk + <) < 0, ∀y ≥ yRg
Taking conditional expectation of the wage equation (8) and using equation
(9), the difference in observable wages across two sectors is:
E(wg(yg)|yg ≥ yRg )− E(wb(yb)|yb ≥ yRb )
= β[E(yg − yRg |yg ≥ yRg )− E(yb − yRb |yb ≥ yRb )]
=
β(σ − 1)(rk + <)
a− 1 > 0 (16)
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5.2 Proof of Proposition (2)
Proof. A rise in L causes < to rise from equation (1). It is apparent from
equation (13) that yRj is strictly increasing in <. A rise in yRj reduces (1 −
F (yRj ))E(yj − yRj |yj ≥ yRj ); hence, θ∗ has to decline to hold equation (11) in
response to the increase in L.
5.3 Proof of Proposition (3)
Proof. A rise in L increases yRj from proposition (2). It is easy to verify that
E(yj|yj ≥ yRj ) rises with yRj . Hence, average labor productivity improves in
each sector.
Using equation (7), E(JEj (yj) − JU |yj ≥ yRj ) = βE(JFj (yj) − JVj |yj ≥
yRj )/(1 − β), ∀j ∈ {b, g}. Hence, the increase in average matching surplus
of workers E(JEj (yj)− JU |yj ≥ yRj ) implies the increase in average matching
surplus of jobs E(JFj (yj) − JVj |yj ≥ yRj ) and the total matching surplus
E(JEj (yj)− JU + JFj (yj)− JVj |yj ≥ yRj ).
Using equations (4) and (7), E(JEj (yj)− JU |yj ≥ yRj ) = βE(yj − yRj |yj ≥
yRj )/(r + λ). Using Pareto distribution, it is easy to show that βE(yj −
yRj |yj ≥ yRj )/(r + λ) = βyRj /[(a − 1)(r + λ)], which is strictly increasing in
yRj . Therefore, average matching surplus of job-seekers and jobs improves for
all j ∈ {b, g}. The total matching surplus, on average, improves in a denser
city.
Using the wage equations (8), E(wj(yj)|yj ≥ yRj ) = rJU + (1− β)E(yj −
yRj |yj ≥ yRj ). E(yj − yRj |yj ≥ yRj ) is shown to be increasing in yRj and thus L.
We need to prove that rJU increases with L. Using equations (6) and (13),
it can be shown that drJU/dL = dyRb /dL > 0 from equation (9). As a result,
wages, on average, rise with L in each sector.
Regarding residual wage inequality, average wage differential across sec-
tors rises with < from equation (16). Using equation (1), < rises with L.
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